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Abstract
Banks typically determine their capital levels by separately analysing credit and 
interest rate risk, but the interaction between the two is significant and potentially 
complex. We develop an integrated economic capital model for a banking book where 
all exposures are held to maturity. Our simulations show that capital is mismeasured if 
risk interdependencies are ignored: adding up economic capital against credit and 
interest rate risk derived separately provides an upper bound relative to the integrated 
capital level. The magnitude of the difference depends on the structure of the balance 
sheet and on the repricing characteristics of assets and liabilities. 
Keywords: Economic capital, risk management, credit risk, interest rate risk, asset and 
liability management 
JEL Classification: G21, E47, C13 5
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Non-technical summary 
According to industry reports, interest rate risk is after credit risk the second most 
important risk when determining economic capital in the banking book. However, no 
unified economic capital model exists which integrates both risks in a consistent 
fashion. Therefore, regulators and banks generally analyse these risks independently 
from each other and derive total economic capital by some rule of thumb. Indeed, the 
most common rule arguably consists in simply “adding up”. A serious shortcoming of 
this procedure is that it obviously fails to capture the interdependencies between both 
risks. The framework developed in this paper captures the complex dynamics and 
interactions of credit and interest rate risk. First, we condition on the systematic 
macroeconomic risk drivers which impact on both risk classes simultaneously. 
Second, we model net-interest income dynamically taking not only account of the 
repricing of assets and liabilities in line with changes in the risk free yield curve but 
also of the impact of changes in the riskiness of credit exposures. This allows us to 
capture the margin compression due to the repricing mismatch between long term 
assets and short term liabilities. However, not only liabilities but also assets get 
repriced over time. This implies that credit risk losses are gradually offset once more 
and more assets reflect the change in the risk-free yield curve as well as changes in 
the credit quality.  
The conceptual contribution of the paper is the derivation of an economic capital 
model which takes account of credit and interest rate risk in the banking book in a 
consistent fashion. The way credit and interest rate risk are modelled individually is in 
line with standard practices. The credit risk component is based on the same 
conceptual framework as Basel II and the main commercially available credit risk 
models. Interest rate risk, on the other hand, is captured by earnings at risk, the 
approach banks use traditionally to measure this risk type. In contrast to standard 
models we integrate both risks using the framework proposed by Drehmann, Sorensen 
and Stringa (2008) taking account of all relevant interactions between both risks. We 
show that changes in net-interest income can be decomposed into two components: 
the first one captures the impact of changes in the yield curve, while the second 
accounts for the crystallisation of credit risk, which implies a loss of interest payments 
on defaulted loans. Conditionally on the state of the macroeconomy, these two 
sources of income risk are independent. This is an important insight as it significantly 6
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simplifies our analysis. But it also underlines that conditioning on the macroeconomic 
environment is crucial for an economic capital model aiming to integrate credit and 
interest rate risk. 
Using our model, we determine capital in line with current regulatory practices. We 
then derive capital based on the integrated approach and compare it to simple 
economic capital, ie the sum of capital set separately against credit and interest rate 
risk. For a hypothetical but realistic bank, we find that the difference between simple 
and integrated economic capital is often significant but it depends on various features 
of the bank, such as the granularity of assets, the funding structure of the bank or the 
bank’s pricing behaviour. However, simple capital exceeds integrated capital under a 
broad range of circumstances. A range of factors contribute to generating this result. 
A relatively large portion of credit risk is idiosyncratic, and thus independent of the 
macroeconomic environment, and the correlation between systematic credit risk 
factors and interest rates is itself not perfect. Furthermore, if assets in the bank’s 
portfolio are repriced relatively frequently, increases in credit risk can be partly 
passed on to borrowers.7
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1 Introduction  
“The Committee remains convinced that interest rate risk in the banking book is a potentially 
significant risk which merits support from capital” (Basel II, §762, Basel Committee, 2006). 
The view expressed by the Basel Committee in the Basel II capital accord receives strong support 
from the data. According to industry reports, interest rate risk is after credit risk the second most 
important risk when determining economic capital for the banking book (see IFRI-CRO, 2007). 
However, no unified economic capital model exists which integrates both risks in a consistent 
fashion for the banking book. Therefore, regulators and banks generally analyse these risks 
independently from each other and derive total economic capital by some rule of thumb. Indeed, 
the most common rule arguably consists in simply “adding up”. A serious shortcoming of this 
procedure is that it obviously fails to capture the interdependencies between both risks. For 
example, the literature has shown consistently that interest rates are a key driver of default 
frequencies, i.e. interest rates risk drives credit risk.
1 And as we will show, credit risk also drives 
interest rate risk in the banking book. This raises several questions: what is the optimal level of 
economic capital if the interdependencies are captured? Do additive rules provide a good 
approximation of the true integrated capital? More importantly, is the former approach always 
conservative or can both risks compound each in some circumstances? In order to answer these 
questions, we derive integrated economic capital for a traditional banking book (where exposures 
are assumed to be non-tradable and held to maturity) and we compare it to economic capital set 
against credit as well as interest rate risk when interdependencies are ignored. We show that this is 
only possible by using an economic capital model, developed in this paper, which consistently 
integrates credit and interest rate risk taking account of the complex repricing characteristics of 
asset and liabilities. 
The dynamic interactions between credit and interest rate risk that lie at the core of our model can 
be illustrated with a simple example. Consider a risk-neutral bank which fully funds an asset A
with some liability L = A; assets and liabilities are held to maturity and subject to book value 
accounting as we assume that there is no market where they can be traded. Assume that A and L
have a time to repricing
2 of one year, and that L gets remunerated at the risk-free rate r0. Under 
risk neutrality, the interest rate charged on A is r0 plus a spread equal to the probability of default 
(PD) times the loss given default (LGD). Net interest income, i.e. income received on assets minus 
income paid on liabilities, is therefore equal to expected losses (EL=PD*LGD*A). If capital is set 
in the standard fashion against credit risk (i.e. as the difference between the expected loss and the 
1 The literature on modelling default is by now so large that an overview can not be given in this paper. For recent 
examples showing a link between interest rates and credit risk see Carling et al. (2006), Duffie et al., (2007) or 
Drehmann et al. (2006). 
2 Time to repricing, not maturity, is the key driver for interest rate risk. The two need not coincide. For example, a 
flexible loan can have a maturity of 20 years even though it can be repriced every three months. Throughout the paper 
we make the simplifying assumption that maturity and time to repricing are the same. 8
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VaR), capital and net interest income indeed cover expected and unexpected losses up to the 
required confidence level. However, one of the key characteristic of banks is that they borrow 
short and lend long, and hence there is a repricing mismatch between assets and liabilities. This 
repricing mismatch is the key source of interest rate risk for banks as changes in the yield curve 
impact more quickly on interest paid on liabilities than interest earned on assets.  
This effect can also be seen in our example. Assume now that interests on liabilities are re-set 
daily rather than annually. If interest rates increase permanently by e.g. 50% after assets are 
priced, interest income from assets remains unaffected (and equal to (r0+PD*LGD)*A) as coupon 
rates of assets are locked-in until the end of the year. However, interest payments on liabilities 
increase in line with the risk-free rate and margins between short term borrowing and long term 
lending get squeezed. In our example, net interest income drops to EL-0.5*r0 *L. If total economic 
capital is only set as the difference between expected losses and VaR for the credit loss 
distribution, losses due to interest rate risk already eat into capital before any credit risk 
crystallises. Therefore, capital is also required against random fluctuations in net-interest income 
or, as it is often referred to, against earnings at risk.
Reality is clearly more complex than our example. First, as has already been pointed out, interest 
rates are an important determinant of the riskiness of credit exposures. Hence, not only does a rise 
in interest rates impact negatively on net interest income, but it also implies higher credit risk 
losses. That said, for a lumpy portfolio, a portion of credit risk is idiosyncratic, and thus 
independent of the macroeconomic environment: the larger the idiosyncratic component, the 
weaker the overall correlation between defaults and interest rates. Second, the crystallisation of 
credit risk reduces interest income: when a loan defaults, the bank looses interest payments as well 
as the principal. Third, the repricing structure of banks’ balance sheets is more complex. A 
substantial fraction of assets (as well as liabilities) mature or can be re-priced during a one year 
horizon. This implies that higher credit risk and higher interest rates can be passed on to 
borrowers, leading to an increase in net interest income. Finally, any change in interest rates and 
credit risk will generally affect the mark-to-market value of the banks’ exposures. The model we 
propose captures the first three channels but not the last one, because we focus on a traditional 
banking book containing non-tradable assets which are valued using book value accounting. 
Therefore, in line with the current regulatory approach, we set capital against realised losses but 
not against changes in the mark-to-market value of the balance sheet.
3 In other words, in our 
model "credit risk" is exclusively determined by default risk and "interest rate risk" is determined 
by net interest income fluctuations stemming from adverse yield curve movements (i.e. the 
earnings implications of repricing, yield curve and basis risk).
Traditionally it would be argued that the sum of economic capital set against credit risk and 
interest rate risk separately is a conservative upper bound in comparison to economic capital set 
against both risks jointly. Breuer et al. (2008) discuss this problem in the context of market and 
3 Our concluding section discusses the implications of this choice.  9
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credit risk assessment for the banking and trading book. Here a similar argument is often made 
that the risk measure of the total portfolio, i.e. the whole bank, is less than the sum of the risk 
measures for the banking and trading book. Breuer et al. show that this argument is based on two 
premises. One is that, under a subadditive risk measure, the risk of a portfolio is smaller or equal 
than the sum of the risks of its components. The other is that the aggregate portfolio of the bank 
can be decomposed into two sub-portfolios – the banking and the trading book – such that credit 
risk is only impacting on the banking book and market risk only on the trading book. In reality, 
this last premise does not necessarily hold – not even approximately. Many positions depend 
simultaneously on both credit and market risk factors. Breuer et al. clarify this in the context of 
foreign currency loans, which depend on classic credit risk factors as well as a market risk factor 
(the exchange rate). The authors show empirically as well as theoretically that, if some positions 
depend on both market and credit risk factors, assuming that the portfolio is separable may result 
in an under- or over-estimation of the actual risk.
This result has strong implications for our work. Regulators and practitioners typically set capital 
against credit and interest rate risk independently, and obtain a measure of total capital by simply 
adding these up (we label this “simple economic capital” for convenience). If risks were separable 
and a sub-additive measure of risk is used, this procedure would always deliver a conservative 
level of capital. But this is a priori unclear, given the highly non-linear interactions between credit 
and interest rate risk. Simple economic capital may actually turn out to be lower than “integrated 
economic capital”, i.e. the capital level implied by a consistent, joint analysis of credit and interest 
rate risk.  
The conceptual contribution of the paper is to derive an economic capital model which takes 
account of credit and interest rate risk in the banking book. The way we set capital against credit 
and interest rate risk individually is fully in line with standard practices. The credit risk component 
is based on the same conceptual framework as Basel II and the main commercially available credit 
risk models. Interest rate risk, on the other hand, is captured by earnings at risk, the approach 
banks commonly use to measure this risk type (see Basel Committee, 2008a). In other words, we 
focus on a traditional banking book where exposures are not marked-to-market and interest rate 
risk arises due to volatility in the bank’s net interest income. In contrast to standard models, 
however, we integrate credit and interest rate risk using the framework proposed by Drehmann, 
Sorensen and Stringa (2008) (henceforth DSS) taking into account all relevant interactions 
between both risks. These are threefold: (a) both risks are driven by a common set of risk factors; 
(b) interest rates are an important determinant of credit risk; and (c) credit risk impacts 
significantly on net-interest income. In the conceptual part of the paper, we show that changes in 
net-interest income can be decomposed into two components: the first one captures the impact of 
changes in the yield curve, while the second accounts for the crystallisation of credit risk, which 
implies a loss of interest payments on defaulted loans. Conditionally on the state of the 
macroeconomy, these two sources of income risk are independent. This important insight 10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1041
April 2009
significantly simplifies their aggregation. It also underlines that conditioning on the 
macroeconomic environment is crucial for an economic capital model aiming to integrate credit 
and interest rate risk.
Using our model, we determine capital in line with current market and regulatory practices as “the 
amount of capital a bank needs to absorb unexpected losses over a certain time horizon given a 
confidence interval” (p. 9 Basel Committee, 2008). We then derive capital over a one year horizon 
based on the integrated approach and compare it to simple economic capital, i.e. the sum of capital 
set separately against credit and interest rate risk. The main result of our empirical analysis is a 
reassuring one: for our stylised bank, which is only subject to credit and interest rate risk in the 
banking book, simple economic capital always seems to provide an upper bound. The quantitative 
difference between simple and integrated economic capital, though, depends on the structure and 
repricing characteristics of the bank’s portfolio. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the 
literature. In Section 3 we derive the integrated economic capital model. Section 4 discusses our 
implementation and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 undertakes some sensitivity tests. 
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
There is by now a large and well known literature on economic capital models for credit risk (for 
an overview see e.g. Gordy, 2000, or McNeil et al., 2005). These models are based on the idea that 
there is one or a set of common systematic risk factors which drive default rates of all exposures, 
but that conditional on a draw of systematic risk factors, defaults across exposures are 
independent. Various models then differ in the way they link default rates and systematic risk 
factors and whether they analytically solve for the loss distribution or simulate it. Our approach to 
credit risk modelling follows this tradition. However, contrary to most models, we condition credit 
risk and the yield curve on a common set or systematic risk factors. Furthermore, we account for 
the loss in coupon payments if assets default.
In contrast to credit risk, no unified paradigm has yet emerged on how to best measure interest rate 
risk in the banking book (e.g. see Kuritzkes and Schuermann, 2007). The Basel Committee points 
to this as an important reason why interest rate risk in the banking book is not treated in a 
standardised fashion in the Basel II capital framework (see§762, Basel Committee, 2006).  
One of the simplest interest risk measures is gap analysis, where banks or regulators assess the 
impact of a parallel shift or twist in the yield curve by purely looking at the net repricing mismatch 
between assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items.
4 By now the literature has identified several 
4 Generally, gap analysis allocates assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items to time buckets according to their 
repricing characteristics and calculates their net difference for each bucket. Because of this netting procedure, gap 
analysis may fail to consider non-linearities and, consequently, underestimate the impact of interest rate risk. For 
example, some short-term customer deposit rates track the risk-free rate plus a negative spread. Hence, for large falls 11
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problems with standard and more sophisticated gap analysis (e.g. see Staikouras, 2006). Therefore, 
there has been a shift to more sophisticated methods based on either static or dynamic simulation 
approaches (see Basel Committee, 2004, 2008). Interest rate risk in the banking book can either be 
measured by earnings at risk or using an economic value approach. The latter measures the impact 
of interest rate shocks on the value of assets and liabilities (e.g. see OTS, 1999, or CEBS, 2006), 
whereas the former looks at the impact of the shocks on the cashflow generated by the portfolio 
(i.e. a bank’s net interest income). This paper follows the traditional earnings at risk approach 
which is heavily used in the industry and for regulatory purposes (see Basel Committee, 2008).  
For capital purposes, regulators only require banks to look at a few specific interest rate risk 
shocks. For example, the standard stress test scenario is a 200bp parallel up-and downward shift of 
the yield curve (see Basel Committee, 2006). Alternatively, the 1
st and 99
th percentile of a five 
years historical distribution can be used as a stress scenario (see Basel Committee, 2004). It is 
interesting to note that the tails of the five year historical distribution generally include either a 
positive or negative 200bp shock but not both.
5 This is already a clear indication that it is 
impossible to explicitly set capital against a few specific scenarios as the probability of these 
scenarios crystallising is changing over time. Furthermore, it is impossible to consider all relevant 
scenarios: individual stress tests cannot by construction cover the full distribution of possible 
outcomes, something we asses using a simulation approach.  
From the perspective of an integrated risk management framework, standard interest rate risk 
analysis used at banks and for regulatory purposes has another important drawback: implicitly, 
these methods assume that shocks to the risk-free yield curve have no impact on the credit quality 
of assets. But clearly this assumption does not hold: interest rates risk and credit risk are highly 
interdependent and, therefore, need to be assessed jointly.
Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) are among the first to show theoretically how to integrate interest rate 
(among other market risks) and credit risk. They propose a simple two factor model where the 
default intensity of borrowers is driven by interest rates and an equity price index, which in turn 
are correlated. Their theoretical framework is backed by strong empirical evidence that interest 
rate changes impacts on the credit quality of assets (see Duffie et al., 2007, or Grundke, 2005).
If papers integrate both risks, they look at the integrated impact of credit and interest rate risk on 
assets only, for example by modelling bond portfolios without assessing the impact of interest and 
credit risk on liabilities or off-balance sheet items. Barnhill and Maxwell (2002) and Barnhill et al.
(2001) measure credit and market risk for the whole portfolio of banks. In contrast to our paper 
they take a mark-to-market perspective. However, they ignore one of the most important sources 
in the risk-free term structure, banks may not be able to lower deposit rates in line with the risk-free rate because they 
face a zero bound on coupons. 
5 Given long interest rate cycles a -(+) 200bp shock is well within the 1% (99%) percentile of the distribution, often 
even well within the 5% (95%), but only in very rare cases are both shocks observed. This observation is based on 
weekly data for the 3 month and 10 year interest rates from the beginning of 1992 to July 2007 for US, UK, Germany 
and the Euro, and five years of observations of annual changes in the interest rates (as suggested by Basel Committee, 
2004). 12
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of interest rate risk – repricing mismatches between assets and liabilities.
 6 Our work focuses on 
the latter, providing a thorough description of how a bank’s maturity structure and pricing 
behaviour affects its risk profile.
The approach of DSS is possibly closest to the operations research literature discussing stochastic 
programming models for dynamic asset and liability management.
7 Early papers include Bradley 
and Crane (1972) or Kus1y and Ziemba (1986), which aim to determine the optimal dynamic asset 
and liability allocation for a bank. However, computational limitations imply that these authors 
can only look at three period binary tree models where assets and liabilities are tradable and 
defaults do not occur. The literature on portfolio optimisation allowing for defaults is so far 
limited. For example, Jobst et al. (2006) look at dynamic optimal portfolio allocation for a 
corporate bond portfolio. They simulate correlated interest rates and credit spreads as well as 
defaults and track future portfolio valuations. As they are interested in optimal portfolio allocation 
they do not assess economic capital even though this should be possible with their framework.  
Dynamic optimal portfolio allocation is beyond the scope of this paper. But rather than looking at 
a portfolio of tradable assets, we consider non-tradable exposures in the banking book of a 
hypothetical bank and model corporate and household credit risk directly. Further, and more 
importantly, by following DSS we capture the complex cash flows from liabilities with different 
repricing characteristics rather than assuming a simple cash account as Jobst and his co-authors 
do.
While we use the framework of DSS to derive net interest income, our implementation differs. For 
their stress test, DSS use the structural macroeconomic model built for forecasting purposes at the 
Bank of England. This model cannot be easily simulated, so the authors focus on central 
projections and expected losses. Instead, we use a two country global macroeconomic vector 
autoregression model (GVAR) to model the macro environment in the spirit of Pesaran et al.
(2004), which allows us to undertake stochastic simulations and therefore enables us to derive the 
full net profit distribution. Furthermore, in contrast to DSS, we look not only at expected losses 
conditional on the macro scenario but also at unexpected credit risk losses for individual exposures 
in the portfolio  
So far there has been a limited discussion how interdependencies across risks impact on economic 
capital. Decomposing net income into its components (i.e. market, credit, interest rate risk in the 
banking book, operational and other risks) and computing returns on risk weighted assets, 
Kuritzkes and Schuermann (2007) find that interest rate risk in the banking book is after credit risk 
the second most important source of financial risks. Furthermore, they show that there are 
diversification benefits between risks.  
Significant diversification benefits are also found in studies which use simple correlations between 
different risks (Kuritzkes et al., 2003, or Dimakos and Aas, 2004). However, as Breuer et al.
6 The papers look at a maturity mismatch of +/- one year and conclude that this is important. But +/- one year is 
clearly too simplistic to capture the full impact of the maturity mismatch on the riskiness of banks. 
7 For an overview of this literature Zenios and Ziemba (2007). 13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1041
April 2009
(2008) point out, the latter approaches implicitly assume that risks are separable which in the case 
of market (and hence interest rate risk) and credit risk is not necessarily true. As already discussed 
in the introduction, in the context of foreign currency loans the authors find that total risk can be 
under- as well as overestimated if market and credit risk are wrongly assumed to be separable. 
This is consistent with the findings in Kupiec (2007). The paper extends a single-factor credit risk 
model to take into account stochastic changes in the credit quality (and hence the market value) of 
non-defaulting loans. The value of the resulting portfolio is a non-separable function of market 
and credit risk factors. The author compares an integrated capital measure to additive measures 
calculated under a range of credit and market risk models, and finds that no general conclusion can 
be reached on whether additive rules under- or overestimate risk.  
It is worth stressing that the diversification issue should ideally be examined within a model that 
integrates all relevant risks, and that such a model is not available to date. For instance, Kupiec 
(2007) or Breuer et al. (2008) focus on the asset side, abstracting from any issues related to 
maturity mismatch and net interest income volatility, whereas in this paper we model these in 
detail but do not consider changes in the economic value of the portfolio. Therefore, the literature 
can currently only provide partial answers to the general question of when and why additive rules 
can underestimate risk. 
3 The framework 
Throughout the framework discussion, we assume that the bank holds a portfolio of N assets with 
A=[A
1,….,A
N].  Each exposure A
i has a specific size, a time to repricing b
i, a default 
probability ) (X PD
i
t , loss given default LGD
i
, and coupon rate  ) (X C
i
t . X is a vector of systematic 
risk factors affecting both interest rates and defaults. To keep the discussion general, we assume 
that X~F  is randomly distributed with an unspecified distribution function F. Following the 
literature, we also assume that conditional on X, defaults across different assets A
i are independent.
As indicated in the introduction, a risk-neutral bank conditions the pricing of loans on current and 
future credit conditions. This is one of the key links between interest rate and credit risk. At 
origination loans are priced in such a way that, given current and expected risk factors, their face 
value coincides with their market value (i.e. the present value of future payments and the 
principal). Under risk neutrality, this implies that expected interest income covers expected credit 
losses. In the multi-period setting, assets are priced not only at the beginning of the simulation but 
at each point in time. However, not all assets get repriced in each period. The time of repricing of 
an individual asset is determined by its repricing maturity. In our empirical implementation this 14
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ranges for example from zero (i.e. the asset gets repriced every period) up to ten years.
8 For the 
derivation of the one period set-up, however, we initially assume that coupons C
i are fixed. 
The bank is funded by M liabilities L=[L
1,….,L
M]. Each liability L
j falls into a repricing bucket b
j
and pays a coupon rate  ) (X C
j
t . In line with assets, coupon rates are assumed to be fixed and equal 
to C 
j in the single period framework but, depending on the repricing characteristics of liabilities, 
change endogenously in the multi-period set-up. All assets and liabilities are held in the banking 
book, using book value accounting.
 
3.1 Single period framework 
To highlight the main mechanism of our framework, we use a very general formation of a 
portfolio loss distribution (e.g. McNeil et al., 2005). However, we slightly change the basic set-up 
to account for the impact of defaults on net interest income. We will focus first on a one period 
model and later extend the analysis to a multi-period set-up. 




i i i i LGD A X X L ) ( ) ( G  (1) 
where i G (X) is a default indicator for asset i taking the value 1 with probability PD
i(X) and the 
value 0 with probability (1-PD
i(X)). We assume conditional independence.
9 Therefore, conditional 
on the state of systematic risk factors X, the default indicators  ) (X i G are i.i.d. Bernoulli random 
variables. Hence, our set-up is in the tradition of Bernoulli mixture models. It has been shown that 
all standard industry models such as CreditRisk+, CreditMetrics, Moody’s KMV and 
CreditPortfolioView but also Basel II can be formulated in this fashion (e.g. see Frey and McNeil, 
2002). Note that generally these models, and in particular Basel II, do not take changes in the 
mark-to-market value into account. The models only differ because of their assumptions on the 
distribution of the systematic risk factors, the mapping between risk factors and PDs, and whether 
they are solved analytically or numerically. Given the complexity of the multi-period framework, 
we will do the latter for our empirical application; we also identify macro factors as the systematic 
risk drivers of PDs in the spirit of Wilson (1997a/b) (see Section 4.4 for details). The 
unconditional probability of incurring l losses P(L=l) is then given by
 dX X F l X L P l L P ³       ) ( ) ( ) (  (2) 
                                                
8 For details of the balance sheet structure used in the empirical implementation see Section 4.1. 
9 This is the standard assumption used in credit risk models implemented for day to day risk management, even 
though recent research has shown that this assumption does not necessarily hold (see Duffie et al, 2007). 15
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A graphical representation of the unconditional loss distribution is given in the Annex Figure A1. 
So far this is in line with standard credit risk portfolio models. It is very easy to take account of net 
interest income in this framework. Net interest income is simply interest payments received on 
assets minus interest payments paid on liabilities. Given coupon rates are fixed for the moment, 
the only stochastic component of net interest income in the one period set-up is whether assets 
default of not.
Take an asset A
i. If no default occurs, the cash flow contribution to interest income is C
iA
i
. In case 
of default, however, the cash flow contribution is only (1-LDG
i)C
iA
i as we assume that coupon 
payments can be partially recovered with the same recovery rate (1-LGD
i) as the principal. Total 






   



















A C LGD X NI
A C LGD X L C A C
L C A C LGD X A C X RNI
) (
) (




   (3) 
As can be seen from equation (3), realised net interest income can be decomposed into a 
component which excludes the effect of default, NI, and a term which sums over coupon losses 






i L C A C NI ¦ ¦     (4) 
Given that coupon rates are pre-determined, the first component in equation (3) (NI)  is not 
stochastic, whilst the latter is. As coupons only default when the underlying asset defaults, the 
latter random component can be simply incorporated into the loss distribution by defining the loss 
including defaulted coupons L* as




i LGD A C X X L ) 1 )( ( : ) ( * G  (1’) 
The corresponding unconditional loss distribution is analogous to that in equation (2). Ultimately 
we are interested in net profits NP(X) which are the sum of credit risk losses and net interest 
income:  
 NP(X)=RNI(X)-L(X)=NI-L*(X)  (5)
The second equality of equation (5) simply takes account of the fact that realised net interest 
income can be decomposed into NI and defaulted coupon payments which are included into L*. 
Since NI is non-stochastic, only L* introduces randomness into net profits. Therefore, the net 16
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profit distribution is identical to the distribution of L* bar a mean shift of the size of NI. Put 
differently, the unconditional probability of realising net profits np is
 
  ³      
       
) ( ) ( *
* ) (
X dF NI np X L P
NI np L P np NP P
 (6) 
Figure A2 in the Annex provides a graphical representation of this argument. Credit risk losses 
enter negatively into net profits, hence the negative sign in equation (6) before (np-NI). Since 
defaulted coupon payments increase losses, L*L and the distribution of -L* is to the left of the 
distribution of -L. Note that L* is not linear in the coupons, so this is not a pure mean shift. NI is 
non-stochastic and positive. Therefore, the net profit distribution is equal to the distribution of -L*, 
except a mean shift of the size of NI. Overall, the mean of the NP distribution is equal to NI-E(L*). 
Standard economic capital models for credit risk assume that the expected loss is covered by 
income. Expected net profits are therefore zero. As an aside, it is interesting to observe that this 




j=L) paying the risk-free 
rate r (C
j=r  j  ), (b) assets and liabilities have a repricing maturity of one period, and (c) banks 
price assets in a risk neutral fashion. This can indeed be seen in our framework. Under the 
conditions stated above, the one-period ahead expected net profits are given by 
   ¦ ¦
¦
    
   
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As shown in Annex 1 the risk-neutral coupon rate in discrete time for an asset with a time to 
repricing of one is
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  (9) 
As will become apparent from our simulation results expected net profits need not be zero if the 
bank is not fully funded by liabilities, assets have different maturities than liabilities, or the bank is 
not pricing assets in a risk-neutral fashion.
10
10 We also implemented this simple example (fully matched bank, risk neutral pricing, one-quarter horizon) in our 
simulation set-up. Mean net profits are indeed zero. Results are available on request.  17
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3.2 The multi-period framework  
In contrast to the single period framework, NI is random in the multi-period set-up because coupon 
rates on assets and liabilities adjust in line with fundamentals. To determine coupon rates in a 
dynamic setting we apply the pricing framework discussed in Annex 1. But in order to account for 
bank and depositors’ behaviour we need to introduce further assumptions: 
(i) Depositors are passive: once deposits mature, depositors are willing to roll them over 
maintaining the same repricing characteristics.
(ii) The bank does not actively manage its portfolio composition: if assets mature or default, 
the bank continues to invest into new projects with the same repricing and risk 
characteristics as the matured assets. At the end of each period, the bank also replaces 
defaulted assets with new assets which have the same risk and repricing characteristics.   
 
These assumptions are essential to ensure that the bank’s balance sheet balances at each point in 
time. Whilst this is a fundamental accounting identity which must hold, risk management models 
often ignore it as profits and losses are not assessed at the same time. This is a crucial innovation 
in the framework of DSS.  
Assumption (ii) is often used in practice by risk managers, who call this “ever-greening” the 
portfolio: once an asset matures, the bank issues a new loan with the same repricing and risk 
characteristics. For example, a matured loan to the corporate sector which originally had a one 
year repricing maturity is replaced by a loan to the corporate sector with a one year repricing 
maturity. Similarly, once an asset defaults, the bank invests in a similar asset with the same 
repricing and risk characteristics. This new asset is funded by reinvesting the recovery value of the 
defaulted loan and the remainder out of current profits or shareholder funds.
11 This implies that at 
the beginning of each quarter the bank holds the same amount of risky assets on its balance sheet. 
We assume that, if the bank makes positive profits, it holds the profits in cash until the end of the 
year without expanding its lending activity.
12 The stock of cash is used to buffer negative net-
profits. Whenever the buffer is not sufficient and capital falls below initial levels, we assume that 
shareholders inject the necessary capital at the end of the quarter. Assumption (i) implies that the 
volume and source of deposits does not change over time. Together with assumption (ii), this also 
means that at the beginning of each period the overall portfolio is the same in terms of risk and 
repricing characteristics.  Clearly, our behavioural assumptions are to a certain degree arbitrary. 
But we restrict ourselves to a simple behavioural rule rather than re-optimising the bank’s 
11 Whilst recovery may not be instantaneous, it is sufficient to assume that the bank can sell the defaulted loan to an 
outside investor who is paying the recovery rate.  
12 By holding profits in cash the bank foregoes potential interest payments. However, given the one-year horizon, 
these are immaterial. As a sensitivity test we replicated our baseline results under the assumption that profits earn the 
risk-free rate of return, and the changes turned out to be negligible. Details are available upon request.  18
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portfolio in a mean-variance sense in each period as this would be beyond the scope of this paper. 
As said, our rules are also commonly assumed by risk managers.
13
Figure 1: Timeline of the multi-period framework 
Figure 1 clarifies the time line of the multi-period framework. The bank starts with an initial 
portfolio  ¦  
i
i A A 0 0 and  ¦  
j
j L L 0 0 . Initial coupon rates for assets/liabilities ( ) ( / ) ( 0 0 0 0 X C X C
j i )
are priced based on macroeconomic conditions X0 at time 0. At the beginning of t=1 a shock hits 
the economy changing the macro conditions to X1, which can already be taken into account when 
the bank reprices all assets and liabilities with a time to repricing of 1. After repricing, credit risk 
losses are realised; then interests on assets and liabilities are paid, and time-1 net profits are 
calculated. Finally, the bank replaces the defaulted assets and re-invests matured assets and 
liabilities. At the beginning of t = 2, X2 is drawn. At this stage the bank can reprice assets and 
liabilities with a repricing maturity of 1 and 2. Then, as in t=1, credit risk losses materialise and 
net profits are calculated. The latter period is repeated until the end of the simulation horizon (in 
our case t=1, …, 4). However, the repricing mechanism becomes increasingly complex over time, 
as different assets mature at different points in time: in t=3 the bank reprices assets with repricing 
maturity 1 and 3, while in t=4 it reprices assets with a repricing maturity of 1, 2, and 4 quarters. 
Annex 2 provides a stylised example of how the repricing mechanism works. 
13 DSS make similar behavioural assumptions, and provide an extensive discussion on how changes in these 
assumptions may affect their results. Their discussion largely applies to our framework as well. 
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3.2.1 NI in the multi-period framework 
In the single period framework, NI  was non-stochastic. However, coupons are now changing 
depending on the repricing characteristics of the underlying assets and liabilities. It is also 
important to recall that every asset (liability) has a different time to repricing bi  (bj). The 
contribution of assets ( ) ( t
A















t A X C I X NI
10
) ( ) (       ( 1 0 )  
where
i
p I =1 in period p, when asset A
i has been repriced the last time prior to time t, and 
i
p I =0 
otherwise. Equation (10) sums across coupon incomes from different assets which have been 
repriced at different periods. Ip=1 for assets which have been repriced the last time in period p and 
therefore earn a coupon rate  ) ( p
i
p X C , which was set taking account of time-p macro conditions 
Xp. Note that assets which had an initial time to repricing of bi>t have not been repriced, so they 
still earn coupon rates  ) ( 0 0 X C
i .
14
Similarly, given that we assume that borrowers are willing to roll over the bank's liabilities, the 
liability contribution  ) ( t
L















t L X C I X NI
10
) ( ) (  (11) 
where
j
p I =1 in period p, when liability L
j has been repriced the last time prior to t, and 
j
p I =0 
otherwise. In line with equation (10), equation (11) sums over all liabilities taking into account the 
last time p t when liabilities have been repriced. Total conditional net interest income NIt(Xt) in 
period t is therefore 




t t t X NI X NI X NI     (12) 
Equation (12) does not account for the impact of defaults on net interest income: it only reflects 
the impact of repricing on interest income.  
Equations (10) and (11) are at the heart of the model. They imply that for every macro scenario we 
need to track coupon rates for all asset and liability classes with different repricing maturities. 
Coupon rates in turn are set in different time periods and depend on the prevailing and expected 
                                                
14 For example in period 4, all assets which had initially a time to repricing bi>4 continue to carry the initial coupon 
rates and hence 
i
p I  is only equal to 1 if p=0. Assets with repricing maturities of less than 4 periods have been repriced 
prior to or at the beginning of period 4. In particular, assets with bi=1,2,4 have been repriced in period 4, so for all 
these assets 
i
p I =1 for p=4, whereas assets with bi=3 were last repriced in period p=3 and hence 
i
p I =1 for p=3. 20
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macro factors at that point in time. In comparison to standard credit risk model, this increases the 
computational complexity enormously.  
3.3 The multi-period profit and loss distribution  
Given our timing (Figure 1), NI t(X t) is non-random in period t as coupon rates of assets and 
liabilities which can be repriced in that period already reflect macro conditions Xt. Therefore, we 
can apply the framework developed in Section 3.1 on an iterative basis. This is a crucial insight of 
our framework and it facilitates the computation significantly as it allows us to disentangle interest 
income and credit risk losses including defaulted coupons. In each period, NI is determined by 
equation (12), and losses due to the default of coupons and principals are determined by equation 
(1’). Note that coupon rates between periods may change and need to be incorporated into (1’) in 















p t t LGD A X C X I X L
10
) ( 1 ) ( ) ( * G  (13) 
where I and į are again indicator functions. 
i
p I =1 in period p, when asset A
i has been repriced the 
last time prior to time t, and 
i
p I =0  otherwise. 1 ) (   t i X G   if asset i  defaults at time t, and 
0 ) (   t i X G  otherwise. The interpretation is again similar to equation (10) and (11). Note however 
that the default indicator does not depend on the repricing maturity but only on credit conditions at 
time t. As in the one period framework (see equation (5)), net profits NPt(Xt) equal the sum of L 
t*(X t) and NIt(Xt). We simulate the model dynamically, so total net profits in period T depend on 
the history of macro risk factors  ]  X ,  , X [X  X T T }   1 0 :
15
 
 ¦ ¦         
T
t t t t t
T
t t t T T X L X NI X NP X NP
1 1 ) ( * ) ( ) ( ) (  (14) 
Analogous to the single period framework, the ex-ante distributions of credit risk losses, net-
interest income and net-profits for time T is the integral over all possible states. Since we cannot 
explicitly derive them, we obtain these distributions by simulation techniques. The specific 
implementation is discussed in the next section, but the mechanism follows our time line. In each 
period, we first draw Xt, then determine NIt, simulate defaults of individual assets and coupons and 
finally calculate NPt. After reinvestment, this process is repeated for the next quarter and so on up 
to time T. In the end we sum across all quarters. We repeat the simulation ten thousands times to 
                                                
15 As excess profits are invested in cash rather than a risk free asset, we can add up net-profits across time without 
taking account of the time value of money. As pointed out in footnote 11 we also undertook a sensitivity test investing 
net-profits in risk free assets. Results differ only marginally and do not change the main message of the paper.  21
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derive the full unconditional distributions. Note that our horizon of interest is one year; since T=4 
throughout the analysis, we drop the time index T in the remainder of the paper.  
3.4 Economic Capital  
As discussed in the introduction, in line with current market and regulatory practices, we set the 
level of capital such that it equals the amount a bank needs to absorb unexpected losses over a 
certain time horizon at a given confidence level (Basel Committee, 2008 or Kuritzkes and 
Schuermann, 2007). In our framework, unexpected losses can arise because of credit risk or 
adverse interest rate shocks.  
For credit and interest rate risk, we follow standard convention and measure unexpected losses as 
the difference between the Value at Risk (VaR) and expected losses. More precisely, the VaR of 
the credit risk loss distribution 
y
CR VaR at a confidence level  ) 1 , 0 (  y is defined as the smallest 
number l such that the probability of L exceeding l is not larger than (1-y):
 )] 1 ( ) ( , inf[ y l L P l VaR
y
CR  d t    (15) 
For risk management purposes the confidence level is generally high with 9 . 0 t y . In line with risk 
management practices, we set economic capital against credit risk 
y
CR EC at the confidence level y 
so that it covers the difference between expected and unexpected losses up to 
y
CR VaR . Or formally  




CR     (16) 
y
CR VAR  and
y
CR EC  are shown in Figure A1 in the Annex. Analogous to credit risk, we define the 
VaR of the NI distribution
z
NI VaR at a confidence level  ) 1 , 0 (  z  as the smallest number ni such 
that the probability of NI exceeding ni is not larger than (1-z). Or
 )] 1 ( ) ( , inf[ z ni NI P ni VaR
z
NI  d t    (17) 
NI  provides positive contributions to net profits, so we are interested in the left tail of the 
distribution. Therefore z is in this case below or equal to 0.1. Given that the focus is on the left tail, 
economic capital (
) 1 ( z
NI EC





NI VaR NI E EC   
 ) (
) 1 (  (18) 
Given this definition, economic capital set at the 99% confidence level covers all unexpected low 
outcomes of NI between the  NI VaR at the 1% level and expected NI. Note that VaRNI and ECNI do 
not incorporate defaulted coupons. As we argue in Section 3, these are an important part of the 
analysis and they can be accounted for equivalently in the income calculation (3) or in the credit 
risk loss calculation (1’). We follow the first route and construct VaR and EC statistics for realised 22
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net interest income RNI, which incorporates the loss of payments on defaulted assets. The 
definitions of VaRRNI and ECRNI are analogous to equations (17) and (18). 
Ultimately, we are interested in risk measures for the net profit distribution. Risk managers do not 
focus on the right tail of this distribution, which constitutes the up-side risk for a bank, but on the 
left tail. In line with  NI VaR , we define the VaR of the net profit distribution 
z
NP VaR at a confidence 
level ) 1 , 0 (  z  as the smallest number np such that the probability of NP exceeding np is not larger 
than (1-z). Or
 )] 1 ( ) ( , inf[ z np NP P np VaR
z
NP  d t    (19) 
Mechanically we could set capital against net profits such that it buffers all unexpected low 
outcomes; i.e. we could set it as the difference between E(NP) and
z
NP VaR . Mathematically this 
definition would make sense. Economically, however, it does not because it implies that the bank 
also holds capital against low but positive profits, even though banks hold, as discussed above, 
capital to buffer (unexpected) losses. To clarify this, say a bank manages its capital to a 95% 
confidence level and  0
% 5 ! NP VaR . Such a bank would not hold any capital as it knows that it makes 
positive profits with a 95% likelihood. Even if it manages capital to a confidence level of 99% and 
0
% 1  NP VaR , the bank would not set capital as the difference between E(NP) and the VaR because it 
does not make sense to “buffer” positive profits. Insofar as the bank only holds capital against net 
losses, a more sensible definition of the economic capital 
) 1 ( z
NP EC
  at a confidence level (1-z) is
0 if



















EC  (20) 
The intuition behind equation (20) is illustrated in Figure A2 in the Annex. Here  0 !
z
NP VaR  at a 
confidence level (1-z),  so no capital is needed. Using a higher confidence level (1-y) some 
unexpected negative net profits (i.e. net losses) can materialise and the bank would set capital to 
buffer the possible negative outcomes.
As discussed in the introduction, we are ultimately interested in assessing whether setting 
economic capital in a naïve fashion by adding economic capital against credit risk and economic 
capital against net interest rate risk (including defaulted coupons) provides a conservative bound 
in comparison with setting capital against net profits. We assess this by looking at the following 
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The larger MEC , the more conservative simple economic capital is. Conversely, if MEC is negative 
then simply adding up the two capital measures independently would underestimate the risk of the 
total portfolio.
 16
In our framework, ECNP covers negative net profits (i.e. net losses) rather than looking at the 
difference between expected net profits and unexpected net profits as ECRNI and ECCR do. This is 
economically sensible, because profit fluctuations have a direct impact on bank capital 
independently of whether they are expected or not. With perfect competition and risk neutral 
pricing, average profits would be zero and the difference would not be material. However if banks 
earn rents (for example by pricing customer deposits below the risk-free rate, as we can observe 
empirically) expected profits are positive, which increases MEC.  In other words, rents may 
introduce a further wedge between “simple” and “integrated” economic capital. 
We maintain that MEC is the most appropriate measure in this context, but to control for this issue 
























Given that we model a banking book, ECCR and ECRNI do not take account of changes in the mark-
to-market valuations of the exposures; hence, they do not capture aspects of (and interactions 
between) credit and interest rate risk which arise when assets are marked to market (we briefly 
discuss this in the conclusions). It can also be argued that ECCR and ECRNI do not fully disentangle 
credit and interest rate risk, in the sense that the former incorporates the effect of higher interest 
rates on default probabilities and the latter the effect of higher (actual or expected) credit risk on 
income. These issues should be certainly kept in mind throughout the discussion of our results. 
The key point, though, is that our framework represents a plausible description of how current 
capital models for the banking book capture these risks. As already discussed, the current 
regulatory approach to credit risk and the commonly used “earnings at risk” approach to interest 
rate risk do not take changes in market valuations into account. Furthermore, some credit risk 
models include a set of macroeconomic risk factors and hence capture (directly or indirectly) some 
of the links between interest rates and credit risk. This is for instance the case for 
CreditPortfolioView (Wilson 1997a, b), the classic example of such an economic capital model. 
To the extent that our ECCR and ECRNI definitions reflect limitations and ambiguities that are 
common to many widely used risk management tools, the model should provide a plausible 
benchmark for our “simple economic capital” setting. Our pricing model represents of course a 
                                                
16 It is well known that VaR is not a coherent risk measure. However, Expected Shortfall is not coherent in our set-up 
either as credit and interest rate risk interact in a non-linear fashion. Therefore we only report economic capital 
numbers based on VaR measures. The insights from all results remain when using expected shortfall instead. Results 
are available on request.  24
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departure from standard modelling practices. Most interest rate risk models do not take account of 
the possible repricing of assets beyond changes in the risk-free rate. Hence, by modelling 
endogenous spreads we add a layer of realism and complexity to the analysis. However, in line 
with standard approaches to model interest rate risk, we also undertake a sensitivity test where all 
spreads are excluded (see Section 6.1).
4 Implementation
Most quantitative risk management models currently used can be described as a chain starting with 
shocks to systematic risk factors feeding into a model that describes the joint evolution of these 
factors and finally a component that calculates the impact on banks’ balance sheets (see Summer, 
2007). Depending on the distributional assumptions and the modelling framework, the loss 
distribution can be derived either analytically or by simulating this chain repeatedly. Our 
implementation follows in this tradition.  
For the discussion it is important to recall the timing shown in Figure1. In the first quarter (t=0)
the balance sheet is fixed and all initial coupons are priced based on the observed macroeconomic 
conditions. Figure A3 in the Annex shows how the simulation works for every subsequent quarter 
t=1, …,4. At the beginning of t=1, we first draw a vector of random macroeconomic shocks and 
determine the state of the macroeconomy using a Global VAR (in the spirit of e.g. Pesaran et al., 
2004). The GVAR also allows us to derive a forward risk-free yield curve. Using a satellite model, 
we then obtain PDs conditional on the new macro conditions. At this point the bank can reprice all 
assets and liabilities in the first repricing bucket, which already allows us to calculate NI. We then 
simulate (conditionally independent) defaults to derive L and RNI and hence net profits NP. At the 
end of the quarter the bank rebalances its balance sheet in line with the behavioural assumptions 
presented in Section 3.2. The remaining forecast periods follow the same structure, except that the 
repricing mechanism becomes increasingly complex as different assets and liabilities are repriced 
at different points in time as discussed in Section 3.2.
4.1 The hypothetical bank  
Table A1 in Annex 3 provides an overview of the balance sheet used for the simulation. It 
represents the banking book of a simplified average UK bank as exposures in various risk and 
repricing buckets are derived by averaging the published balance sheets of the top ten UK banks.
In order to limit the number of systematic risk factors we have to model, we assume that the bank 
only has exposures to UK and US assets. This reduces the complexity of the simulation 
considerably without diminishing the insights of the paper. We look at seven broad risk classes in 
both the UK and the US: interbank; mortgage lending to households, unsecured lending to 
households; government lending; lending to PNFCs (private non financial corporations); lending 25
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to OFCs (other financial corporations, i.e. financial corporations excluding banks); and “other”. 
Exposures within an asset class are homogenous with respect to PDs and LGDs. We assume that 
the bank is fully funded by UK deposits. These consist of interbank, household, government, 
PNFC, OFC, subordinated debt, and “other”.
Contrary to DSS, we model a portfolio which is not infinitely fine grained. Since no data are 
available on the size of the exposures, we construct a hypothetical loan size distribution for each 
asset class. Anecdotal evidence suggests that loan size distributions are approximately log-normal. 
Therefore, we assume that asset sizes are log-normally distributed with variance one and a mean 
of £300.000 for household mortgage exposures, £50.000 for unsecured household lending, 
£100mn for PNFC and £200mn for OFC. The resulting distributions are shown in Figure A4 in the 
Annex. This parameterisation is very much “back of the envelope” based on the limited 
information we have. But it delivers a size distribution which looks similar to the size distribution 
in other countries where detailed data are available. We will also undertake a sensitivity test to 
assess the implications of an infinitely fine-grained portfolio.
All exposures are assumed to be non-tradable and held to maturity using book value accounting. In 
line with accounting standards, assets and liabilities are allocated to five repricing buckets as 
shown in Table A1. For the actual analysis assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items in the last 
three buckets are assumed to be uniformly distributed over quarters within each bucket. For the 
last bucket we assume that the maximum time to repricing is ten years. The interest rate sensitivity 
gap is the difference between assets and liabilities in each repricing bucket.  
It is important to stress that we are using repricing buckets rather than maturity buckets in order to 
correctly capture the impact of changes in the macro-economic environment on the bank’s net 
interest income and hence profits. This means that, for example, a flexible mortgage with a 20-
year maturity that reprices every three months is allocated to the three-month repricing bucket. As 
DSS show, the repricing characteristics are the key determinant of interest rate risk in the banking 
book. The interest rate sensitivity gap relative to total assets of our balance sheet is fully in line 
with the average interest rate sensitivity gap of the top ten UK banks in 2005.
17 Given that in the 
UK mortgage borrowers predominantly borrow on a flexible rate basis, a high proportion of assets 
is allocated to the 0-3 months repricing bucket (see Table A1).
18
In contrast to DSS we do not look at interest sensitive off-balance sheet items. UK banks on 
average use these items to narrow the repricing gap between short term borrowing and long term 
                                                
17 Under UK accounting standards known as FRS 13, UK banks have to publish the interest sensitivity gap of on-
balance and off-balance sheet exposures in their annual accounts.  
18 The average interest rate sensitivity gap relative to total assets in the UK is stable over time, but given varying 
economic and institutional conditions there are differences across countries. For example, given a much higher 
proportion of fixed rate mortgages 50.2% of loans and securities have a remaining time to repricing greater than one 
year  for the average US bank, in comparison to 20.7% for the average UK bank (at the end of 2005). The liability 
side looks more similar for the average UK and US bank. For the latter 12.5% of liabilities have a remaining time to 
repricing of more than a year, whereas the proportion in the UK is 8.3% (for US data see FFIC, 2006).  26
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lending. Hence, the interest rate risk estimated in this paper should be more significant than for the 
actual average UK bank. The repricing structure of the balance sheet is crucial in determining 
interest rate risk, so we perform a number of sensitivity tests on our baseline assumptions.  
4.2 Shocks, the macro model and the yield curve 
To model the macro environment, we implement a two-country version of Pesaran, Schuermann 
and Weiner’s (2004) Global VAR model. Within a generic GVAR, each country is modelled as a 
standard vector autoregression (VAR) augmented by a set of contemporaneous and lagged 
‘foreign’ factors, constructed as weighted averages of the other countries’ variables. Pesaran and 
co-authors show that, under fairly general conditions, foreign variables are weakly exogenous 
within each country-specific VAR. Hence, the VARs can be estimated individually and then 
combined to generate mutually consistent forecasts for the whole world economy. Following 
Pesaran et al. (2006), we use the GVAR as a reduced-form model of systematic (national and 
international) risk factors. 
In our simplified two-country framework, the UK is a small open economy and the US a closed 
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(where x
i
t is a vector of risk factors specific to country i). From a UK perspective, this can be 
interpreted as a GVAR based on a degenerate weighting scheme: we implicitly construct the ‘rest 
of the world’ by assigning weights of one to the US and zero to all other countries.
19
Variables and data are the same as in Dees et al. (2007). For the UK, xt contains real output 
(GDPt), CPI inflation (CPIt), real equity prices (EQPt), an overnight nominal interest rate (SRt), a 
20-year synthetic nominal bond interest rate (LRt) and the real exchange rate against the dollar 
(EXt). For the US, the real exchange rate is replaced by oil prices (OILt). The sample is 1979Q1–
2005Q4.
We estimate all equations in (23) by OLS. The systems appear to contain stochastic trends and 
cointegrating relationships (see Dees et al., 2007), so this procedure may not be fully efficient. 
However, OLS deliver (super)consistent estimates of all parameters. Furthermore, given the focus 
of the paper, imposing theoretical restrictions on the macroeconomic data is unnecessary. 
Diagnostic tests (not reported for brevity) show that the estimation generates approximately 
normal i.i.d. residuals.
                                                
19 Pesaran et al.’s (2004) weak exogeneity is an asymptotic result obtained assuming a large number of countries, and 
would not hold in a symmetric two-country world. Assuming that the US is a closed economy allows us to circumvent 
this problem. 27
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The pricing of coupons requires a yield curve which is conditional on macroeconomic factors. We 
use a very simple specification and assume that the yield curve is a linear interpolation of the short 
(SRt) and long (LRt) interest rates. This is the source of all risk-free rates used in the model. 




t t H H H    from a multivariate normal 
distribution with mean zero and the variance-covariance matrix estimated in equation (23). 
4.3 Modelling PDs and LGDs for different asset classes 
To estimate the impact of macro factors on PDs we use simple equations in the spirit of Wilson 
(1997,a,b) .
20 As it has already been mentioned, we assume that loans within a particular asset 
class are homogenous with respect to their risk characteristics, i.e. they all have the same PD and 
LGD. This assumption is dictated by data limitations, as only aggregate default frequencies for 
corporate and household lending are available in the UK. Because of informal debt restructurings, 
recorded data on bankruptcies tend to underestimate the true scale of default, especially in relation 
to household unsecured debt: even if a loss-given-default (LGD) of 100% is chosen, implied 
write-offs calculated on the basis of PD*LGD are significantly below the recorded figures. To 
adjust for this, bankruptcy data is scaled up.
Given this adjustment, default probabilities within an asset class are then estimated as a function 








t SRR EQP GDP OD H E E E D   '  '       1 3 1 2 1 1  (24)   
where
ac
t OD is the quarterly log-odds transform of the (adjusted) default ratio for asset class ac.
21
The literature suggests that GPD and equity returns should have a negative effect on credit risk 
whilst interest rate should increase the riskiness of an asset class. Overall this is a very simplified 
PD model, which nonetheless allows us to forecast average PDs in every scenario in a consistent 
fashion.
We assume that LGDs are fixed. Broadly in line with average industry numbers, we assume that 
the LGDs are 40% for interbank loans, 30% for mortgage loans, 100% for credit card loans and 
80% for corporate loans. 
4.4 Pricing of assets 
We calculate coupons using the risk-neutral pricing model proposed in DSS (see Annex 1). Given 
the non-linearity of the model, we can only implement the framework by introducing two 
                                                
20 The equations were developed as part of measurement model for the UK financial stability; for an overview over 
21 The log-odds transformation ensures that aggregate default frequencies remain within the 0-1 boundary. It is 
equivalent to assuming that PDs follow the more standard formulation in the spirit of Wilson i.e. PDs=1/(1+exp(-
ȕX)).
this model see Alessandri et al. (2009). 28
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approximations. These are discussed in detail in Annex 3, where we also show that they do not 
bias our results.
It is well known that there is no simple mapping from actual PDs, which we simulate, into risk-
neutral PDs, which we require for pricing (see e.g. Duffie and Singleton, 2003). The empirical 
literature has found that the jump-to-default risk premia defined as the ratio of risk neutral over 
actual PDs varies between 1 and 4 (see Driessen, 2005, Saita 2006 or Berndt et al. 2005).
22 At this 
stage it is hard to derive firm conclusions from the literature that could be easily implemented in 
our already complex model. But acknowledging the fact that the jump-to-default risk may be 
greater than one, we include the fixed risk premia presented in Table A2 in Annex 3.  
By not modelling the risk premia explicitly we may introduce a downward bias in the bank’s net 
interest income, as our coupon rates on assets are likely to be implausibly low at times of stress. 
Implicitly, we also assume perfectly competitive markets: the bank prices every new loan issue 
fairly and individually rather than with respect to the risk contribution to its portfolio. Overall, we 
conjecture that an economic capital framework looking at the lower tail of the net profit 
distribution without any spreads provides a conservative assessment of the actual risk profile of 
the bank. 
4.5 Pricing of liabilities 
In theory, the bank’s liabilities should be priced similarly to assets using the bank’s own PD and 
LGD. While this seems to be the case for banks’ debt instruments, it is well known that shorter-
term customer deposit rates are generally below the risk-free interest rate even when accounting 
for non-interest costs net of fees. This may be the result of deposit insurance schemes or barriers to 
entry limiting competition (see e.g. Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002). While an economic 
rationalisation of negative spreads can be found for short maturities, it is not convincing for 
medium to long maturities. We assume that, as the time-to-repricing increases, the interest paid by 
the bank on deposits gradually converges to the risk-free interest rate. Other liabilities pay the risk-
free interest rate or in case of sub-ordinate debt, interbank and other liabilities the risk-free interest 
rate plus a fixed 15bp spread. All liability spreads are summarized in Table A3 in the Annex. 
Essentially all deposits can be seen as fully insured by a deposit insurance scheme.  
4.6 The simulation 
Our initial macroeconomic and balance sheet data are end-2005. The forecast horizon is one year. 
The simulation follows the time line described in Figure 1. We simulate 10,000 macro scenarios. 
In each of these scenarios, we draw one realisation per quarter of the portfolio loss distribution 
using Monte Carlo methods. 
                                                
22 For example, Saita (2006) estimates the actual one-year PD for Xerox in December 2000 was 4.8% whilst he 
extracts 13% as the one-year risk neutral PD. This implies a jump-to-default risk premium of 2.7.   29
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5 Results
5.1 Macro factors, PDs and interest rates 
Figure A5 in the Annex provides an overview over the distribution of macroeconomic variables in 
the UK after four quarters. US variables look generally similar. Several things are noteworthy. 
First, all macro variables are roughly normally distributed. Given we simulated the GVAR using 
normally distributed innovations this is not surprising. Second, after four quarters, several 
recessionary scenarios emerge where interest rates fall and inflation picks up. However, we also 
observe scenarios where interest rates increase substantially. Third, there are several scenarios 
where short term as well as long interest rates changed by more than 200bp at the end of the 
simulation – the stress test scenarios generally used to measure interest rate risk in the banking 
book. From a regulatory perspective this is very interesting as it suggests that a 200bp shock may 
not be very severe. The distributions of quarterly default rates for UK corporate and household 
borrowers in Q4 are shown in Figure A6 in Annex 4. It is apparent that PDs remain very low in all 
simulations. This is partly due to the initial conditions: PDs were very low in 2005 by historical 
standards. But it also reflects the relatively weak impact of macro factors on default rates in the 
PD model used for the simulation. 
5.2 The impact on the bank 
Figure 2 and Table 1 provide an overview over various components of the profit and loss 
distribution. Even though macro variables and PDs are roughly normally distributed, credit risk 
losses show the characteristic fat tail (Panel A). Credit risk losses range from a minimum of 0.8bn 
to a maximum of 16bn. Interestingly, mean credit risk losses are around 1.37bn, which fits 
reasonably closely with the reported average provisions of UK banks of 1.59bn for 2006 – the year 
we forecast – even though our balance sheet is highly stylised and losses do not map one-to-one 
into provisions. 
In line with the distribution of simulated interest rates, net interest income (Panel B) is roughly 
normally distributed and it shows a much smaller variance than the credit risk loss distribution.
23
The mean realised net interest income, which accounts for defaulted coupons, is 4.8bn. This is 
lower than the reported average net interest income of 6.32bn for 2006, possibly because the 
spreads we add to the risk-neutral coupon rates are not high enough. Clearly, this may also be a 
result of our assumed balance sheet as our bank is only funded in one currency.  
                                                
23 Throughout the paper we assume that assets and liabilities are priced fairly at the beginning of the simulation. As an 
additional robustness check we also ran simulations assuming that assets and/or liabilities are 20% over or under-
priced. The initial mis-pricing changes only the mean of the net-profits distribution but not its shape in line with the 
results shown in Section 6.1 therefore not discussed further. Results are available on request. 30
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Panel B also shows that the impact of defaulted coupons on realised net interest income (RNI) is 
relatively small in absolute terms. As expected, the reduction in net interest income due to 
defaulted coupon rates (Panel C) is exactly in line wit the credit risk loss distribution (Panel A). 
Overall, the net profit distribution (Panel D) shows a significant negative fat tail, even though net 
profits are positive in more than 98% of the simulations. 
Figure 2: Annual profit and loss distributions 
Panel A: Credit Risk Losses 











Panel B: Net interest income 









Panel C: Reduction in net interest income 
due to defaulted assets (NI-RNI) 









Panel D: Net profit distribution 












Note: in millions. In panels B and D, the blue (red) line shows the distribution excluding (including) the impact of defaulted coupon payments. 31
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Table 1: Losses, income and profits 
mean median st.dev. min max .1 %tile 1 %tile 5% tile 95 %tile 99 %tile 99.9 %tile
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,871
Net interest income (NI) 4,810 4,810 259 3,793 5,680 4,014 4,199 4,386 5,233 5,395 5,535
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 4,782 4,781 260 3,764 5,647 3,973 4,170 4,353 5,206 5,371 5,514
Net-Profits 3,404 3,581 815 -10,991 4,570 -4,183 -112 2,031 4,061 4,251 4,434
Note: in millions.  
5.3 Economic Capital  
Table 2 provides and overview over economic capital against different risks at different 
confidence levels. Given the skew of the credit risk loss distribution, economic capital against 
credit risk (ECCR) is non-linearly increasing in the confidence level. This is less pronounced for 
economic capital against changes in net interest income (ECNI and ECRNI ) because the underlying 
net income distributions only show a slight skew. The ratio of ECRNI to ECCR therefore decreases 
from around 30% at the 95% confidence level to 11% at the 99.9% confidence level. These 
numbers seem broadly in line with banks’ practices. For example, the IFRI-CRO (2007) report 
suggests that for an average bank the ratio of the capital set against interest rate risk relative to 
capital set against credit risk is 16%. But given different balance sheet structures, this ratio 
exhibits a significant variance and can reach 50% or more.  
Table 2: Economic Capital
95% 99% 99.9%
ECCR 1,348 3,412 7,493
ECNI 424 611 797
ECRNI 429 612 809
ECCR+ ECRNI 1,777 4,024 8,302
ECNP 0 112 4,183
MEC 100.00% 97.21% 49.62%
E(NP)-VaR NP 1,372 3,516 7,586
M 2 22.76% 12.62% 8.62%
Confidence Level
Note: in millions. ECCR is the economic capital against credit risk; ECNI is the economic capital against changes in net interest income excluding the 
impact of defaults on coupon payments; ECRNI is the economic capital against changes in net interest income including the impact of defaults on 
coupon payments; ECNP is the economic capital against changes in net profits. MEC is the ratio of [(ECCR+ ECRNI)- ECNP] over (ECCR+ ECRNI).
E(NP) are expected net profits. VaRNP is theVaR of net profits at confidence interval (1-y) where y is the confidence level stated in the table. M2 is
the ratio of [(ECCR+ ECRNI) – (E(NP)-VaRNP)] over (ECCR+ ECRNI). See Section 3.4.
The key question of this paper is whether simple economic capital provides a conservative upper 
bound. Simple economic capital is just the sum of ECRNI and ECCR. This is significant at all 
confidence levels. However, taking the complex dynamic interactions of credit and interest rate 
risk into account, the bank makes positive net profits in more than 95% of the scenarios. 32
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Therefore, integrated economic capital (ECNP) at this confidence level is zero. Even at the 99% 
confidence level, integrated economic capital would be minimal and less than 3% of simple 
economic capital. Only at the 99.9% percentile economic capital against net profits reaches a 
substantial amount, but is still only around 50% of simple economic capital. 
The difference between simple and integrated economic capital is very large. The bottom of the 
table shows that this gap is mostly due to the fact that integrated capital covers only unexpected 
negative profits. As we explain in Section 3.4, M2 is an alternative measure that treats profits in the 
same way as credit risk losses, assuming that capital is set aside against unexpectedly low profits 
independently of whether these are positive or negative. By this metric, integrated capital is again 
lower than simple capital but only by an 8% to 20% margin (depending on the confidence level). 
In Section 3.4 we argue that M2 is not an economically sensible indicator, so in the reminder of the 
discussion we focus on MEC and report M2 purely for completeness. In any case, our main result 
proves to be extremely robust: in all the cases we consider, simple economic capital provides an 
upper bound independently of whether we look at MEC or M2.
6  Sensitivity analysis 
6.1 The impact of pricing 
To assess the impact of different pricing assumptions, we first drop all negative spreads on 
deposits, then we drop all additive spreads on assets as well as liabilities. Finally, we assess the 
implication on net interest income if all assets and liabilities are priced as risk-free instruments. 
The results of the latter test can be seen as roughly equivalent to the outcome of a simple gap 
analysis.   
Table A4 in the Annex shows the summary statistics for the profit and loss distributions of these 
tests. As more than 75% of the bank’s deposits are corporate and household deposits with a time to 
repricing of one year of less, the rents earned by negative spreads are significant. Mean NI and 
RNI drop by around 30% in comparison to the base case (see Table 1). Given the additive nature 
of the spreads, the whole NI and RNI distribution by and large shifts linearly down. This can be 
seen in Table A5, where we compare the distributions after de-meaning them to net out the 
downward shift.
The impact of additionally dropping additive spreads on assets and all other liabilities is similar. 
The shape of the NI and RNI distributions remains essentially the same as above. However, the 
mean NI and RNI are now roughly 50% lower than in the base case (see Table A4 and Table 1).
A bank earns a substantial part of its net interest income by (re-)pricing assets according to their 
risk. Hence, NI is even lower if the bank charges only the risk-free rate. However, on average the 33
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bank still earns a positive net interest income, which is driven by the original repricing mismatch 
of its book and the fact that equity funding is non interest rate bearing (see Section 6.2.3).
Table 3: Economic capital under different pricing assumptions. 
95% 99% 99.9% 95% 99% 99.9% 95% 99% 99.9%
ECCR 1,348 3,412 7,493 1,348 3,412 7,493 1,348 3,412 7,493
ECRNI 415 593 783 414 593 781 420 597 797
ECCR+ ECRNI 1,763 4,005 8,276 1,763 4,005 8,275 1,768 4,009 8,290
ECNP 0 1,621 5,686 344 2,483 6,543 836 2,955 7,050
MEC 100.00% 59.52% 31.30% 80.48% 38.01% 20.93% 52.69% 26.30% 14.97%
E(NP)-VaR NP 1,376 3,518 7,582 1,374 3,513 7,573 1,379 3,497 7,593




Confidence Level Confidence Level
No negative spreads on liabilities
See note to Table 2. 
As long as defaulted coupon rates are taken into account in RNI, spreads do not alter the credit risk 
loss distribution (see Table 3). Hence, ECCR is exactly the same as in the base case. As we saw 
above, additive spreads generate a mean shift in the net interest income distribution but virtually 
do not affect its shape (see Table A4). Therefore, ECRNI never changes by more than 3.5% relative 
to the base case under any pricing assumptions. However, given the downward shift in its mean 
income, the bank incurs net losses more often; the lower the spreads, the more likely negative net 
profits are. Hence ECNP is higher than in the base case at all confidence levels and the difference 
between simple and integrated economic capital is less pronounced, though it remains large and 
positive even under risk-free pricing.  
6.2 The impact of granularity  
It is well know that the granularity of a portfolio changes the shape of the credit risk distribution. 
A comparison of Table 1 with Table A6 in the Annex illustrates this point clearly. Whilst the mean 
credit risk losses are equal, the standard deviation of credit risk losses drops enormously for an 
infinitely fine-grained portfolio (from 765 to 34). Less default variability maps one to one into a 
lower default frequency for coupon rates, which in turn impacts RNI. On the other hand, given 
that the pricing is based on expected losses, NI is unaffected by the changes in the granularity of 
the underlying portfolio.24 Given the positive rents earned on deposits and liabilities, the bank 
always makes positive net profits. Hence, integrated capital is zero at all confidence levels (see 
Table 4).
                                                
24 Computational limitations imply that quantiles of the NI distribution in the granular case differ by around 0.02%-
0.05% from the base case.  34
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Table 4: Economic capital for an infinitely fine-grained portfolio 
95% 99% 99.9%
ECCR 58 83 108
ECRNI 428 598 787
ECCR+ ECRNI 486 680 895
ECNP 000
MEC 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
E(NP)-VaR NP 438 605 806
M 2 9.71% 11.04% 9.93%
Confidence Level
See note to Table 2. All exogenous spreads are set as in the baseline simulation. 
6.3 The impact of the repricing mismatch  
Whilst the granularity of assets only changes the shape of the credit risk loss distribution, shifts in 
the time to repricing of assets and liabilities impact only on net interest income. To see the 
implications of different repricing characteristics, we look at two extreme cases. In the first (which 
we call “all short”) we assume that the bank is fully funded by short liabilities. In this case all 
liabilities are shifted to the 1-3 months bucket. In the second (which we refer to as “all long”) all 
liabilities are assumed to have a time to repricing of more than one year. Given that our simulation 
has a one year horizon, this implies that liabilities do not get repriced and generate fixed net 
interest payments for the bank.
25
Table A7 in the Annex provides an overview over the profit and loss distribution in both cases. As 
expected the volatility of NI is in both cases significantly higher than in the base case. However, 
the volatility for the “all long” case is three times higher than in the “all short” case. And the 
minimum NI for the former is -3.1bn in comparison to 2.4bn for the latter or 3.8bn in the base 
case. This result may seem surprising: one would expect income volatility to decrease if the 
funding costs are fixed. A look at Table A8 explains the result: in absolute terms, the interest rate 
sensitivity gap at short repricing maturities is actually highest in the "all long" case.
26 This implies 
much higher volatility in NI, so ECRNI is at all confidence levels around seven times larger than in 
the base case (see Table 5 and Table 2). In comparison, in the “all short” case ECRNI is only about 
twice as large as in the base case.  
                                                
25 In both cases the repricing characteristics of assets, the portion of non interest bearing assets and liabilities and all 
additive spreads are kept as in the baseline. 
26 The interest rate sensitivity gaps for the 1-3 months bucket are -23% for “all short”, -10% for the base and +52% for 
“all long”. 35
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Table 5: Economic capital under alternative funding assumptions 
95% 99% 99.9% 95% 99% 99.9%
ECCR 1,348 3,412 7,493 1,348 3,412 7,493
ECRNI 978 1,386 1,841 3,166 4,521 5,949
ECCR+ ECRNI 2,326 4,798 9,335 4,514 7,934 13,442
ECNP 0 386 4,471 217 1,897 5,056
MEC 100.00% 91.95% 52.11% 95.19% 76.09% 62.39%
E(NP)-VaR NP 1,525 3,668 7,753 3,493 5,173 8,332
M 2 34.41% 23.55% 16.94% 22.63% 34.80% 38.02%
All short All long
Confidence Level Confidence Level
See note to Table 2. All exogenous spreads are set as in the baseline simulation. 
The “all long” bank has a positive sensitivity gap: contrary to standard banks, it borrows long and 
lends short. This repricing mismatch makes it vulnerable to drops (rather than increases) in the 
interest rate, which is good news for integrated risk management, as low interest rates imply low 
credit risk. Therefore, integrated economic capital could be lower than in the base case. On the 
other hand, the larger absolute interest rate gap leads to higher income volatility. Given these 
conflicting channels, the overall effect on ECNP is a priori unclear. Table 5 shows that the second 
effect dominates: integrated economic capital is at all confidence levels higher than in the base 
case. The same is true for the “all short” bank. MEC does not give a clear message: it can be higher 
or lower than in the baseline depending on the confidence level and the assumed pricing maturity. 
We do not have an explanation for these differences. Nonetheless, we stress that simple economic 
capital proves to be an upper bound in all cases.
6.4 The impact of equity  
The discussion so far begs the question of what is the optimal capital level for the bank. Since 
shareholder funds are non-interest bearing, this does not simply coincide with the ECNP figure 
calculated in the baseline case. We assume that the bank does not pay any dividends during the 
year and that equity simply receives the accumulated profits at the end of the year. This implies 
that no cash flows have to be paid on equity during our simulation horizon. Hence, the higher the 
equity, the lower the interest payments on liabilities. In the extreme, if a bank were fully funded by 
equity, interest payments on liabilities would be zero and income would be only based on interest 
income from assets.  
Table A9 in the Annex provides an overview of the simulated statistics for 0%, 4% and 8% equity 
levels. All additional spreads for assets and liabilities are set to zero to isolate the impact of 
changing equity levels. Indeed, decreasing the amount of equity changes the NI distribution 36
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substantially. Dropping equity from 8% to 4% decreases the mean NI by 22% and increases the 
standard deviation by more than 50%. Similarly, diminishing equity from 4% to 0% decreases the 
mean NI by nearly 40% and increases the standard deviation by another 26%. As has been shown 
by several previous sensitivity tests, the distribution of credit risk losses is unaffected by the 
funding structure of the bank. Changes in the RNI distribution are therefore driven by shifts in the 
NI distribution.
Table 6: Economic capital for initial equity levels of 0%, 4% and 8% 
95% 99% 99.9% 95% 99% 99.9% 95% 99% 99.9%
ECCR 1,348 3,412 7,493 1,348 3,412 7,493 1,348 3,412 7,493
ECRNI 576 820 1,086 429 614 810 281 407 537
ECCR+ ECRNI 1,924 4,232 8,580 1,778 4,026 8,303 1,630 3,819 8,031
ECNP 1,092 3,203 7,326 408 2,549 6,615 0 1,838 5,954
MEC 43.25% 24.32% 14.61% 77.06% 36.68% 20.33% 100.00% 51.86% 25.86%
E(NP)-VaR NP 1,395 3,506 7,630 1,371 3,513 7,578 1,366 3,461 7,577
M 2 27.48% 17.15% 11.08% 22.88% 12.76% 8.73% 16.20% 9.36% 5.65%
0% equity 4% equity
Confidence Level Confidence Level
8% equity
Confidence Level
See note to Table 3. All exogenous spreads are set to zero.  
The impact of initial equity levels on ECRCI and ECNP can be seen in Table 6. The table clearly 
shows that the higher the initial equity, the lower the necessary capital to buffer against credit and 
interest rate risk losses. This is purely driven by the fact that expected net interest income is higher 
for higher equity because the bank does not need to pay any dividends or interest to equity holders 
over the course of the year. The difference between simple economic capital and integrated 
economic capital is therefore also larger for higher levels of initial equity levels.
According to ECNP, the 99.9% economic capital for the bank should only be 6.6bn, which is 
approximately 2% of total assets (see Table 6). This would suggest that the optimal capital level is 
lower than 4%, but this conclusion should be taken with a large grain of salt. Our result is 
obviously conditional on specific assumptions on the granularity and pricing characteristics of the 
balance sheet. We also do not take account of any other sources of risk, such as other market risk 
factors or operational risk. Importantly, in our simulation we only consider fully insured costumer 
deposits. Hence, depositors do not demand a higher risk premium for higher leverage; this would 
decrease net interest income and raise its volatility, which in turn impact on integrated capital.  
7 Conclusion and discussion
This paper provides a consistent framework to derive economic capital against credit and interest 
rate risk in the banking book. We formulate an economic capital framework where interest and 
credit risk interact in a non-linear, dynamic fashion. We apply this framework to a stylised UK 
bank, comparing a “simple economic capital” measure that purely adds economic capital against 37
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credit and interest rate risk to an “integrated” measure that takes into account the interactions 
between them. We find that the difference between the two measures depends on various features 
of the bank, but that simple capital exceeds integrated capital under a broad range of 
circumstances, providing an upper bound relative to the bank's overall risk.  
 A range of factors contribute to generating this result. A relatively large portion of credit risk is 
idiosyncratic, and thus independent of the macroeconomic environment, and the correlation 
between systematic credit risk factors and interest rates is itself not perfect. Furthermore, assets in 
the bank’s portfolio are repriced relatively frequently, and hence increases in credit risk can be 
partly passed on to borrowers. Our analysis also rests on a number of assumptions: for instance we 
do not account for prepayment risk (which is negligible in the UK but quite substantial in the US), 
hedging, or subordinated debt. Given the magnitude and robustness of our results, though, our 
conjecture is that extending the model in these directions would not change our main conclusion.  
More importantly, we emphasise that, since we focus on traditional banking book risks, relating 
our insights to the recent crisis is not trivial. Securitisation, derivatives and liquidity management - 
which were at the core of the turmoil - remain outside the scope of this paper. Furthermore, 
changes in the economic value of the portfolio are not taken into account as all exposures are 
assumed to be non-tradable and therefore valued using book value accounting. It is difficult to 
speculate on whether “integrated capital” would remain lower than “simple economic capital” in a 
context where these restrictions are relaxed. In fact, the findings in Breuer et al. (2008) and Kupiec 
(2007) suggest that there may be no general answers to this type of questions. As a consequence, 
risk managers and regulators should work on the presumption that interactions between risk types 
may be such that the overall level of capital is higher than the sum of capital derived for risks 
independently. Our paper shows that this is unlikely for credit and interest rate risk in the banking 
book, but also that additive rules are in this case potentially very inefficient. From a risk 
management perspective, this should provide another strong enough incentive to move towards an 
integrated analysis of risks. 38
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Annex 1: Endogenous coupon rates
This annex is based on Drehmann, Stringa and Sorensen (2007). The economic value EVA
i of a 
generic asset i with time to repricing of T (which is also for simplicity equal to its maturity) is 
simply the risk-adjusted discounted value of future coupon payments  ) ( s
i
s X C  and the principal A.


















   ¦      (A1) 
For simplicity we assume that all assets are equivalent to bullet bonds – i.e. repay the principal 
only at maturity and pay a constant coupon 
i
s C  that is determined at time t=s  based on the 
observed macroeconomic variables Xs. For example, such an asset could be a fixed-interest rate 
bond with no embedded options or a simple bank loan. The discount function conditional on 
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where R is the risk-adjusted interest rate. In continuous time, R equals the risk-free rate plus a 
credit risk premium equal to PD*LGD. However, as our application is set up in discrete time, we 
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where l t l t r    , 1  is the forward risk-free interest rate between t+l-1 and t+l known at time t. 
i LGD  is 
the expected loss given default for borrower i which, for simplicity, we assume here to be 
constant.
i
l t l t PD    ; 1  is the risk neutral probability of default of borrower i between t+l-1 and t+l 
conditional on surviving until t+l-1. PDs and yields depend on the same set of systematic risk 
factors Xt.
We do not observe empirical coupon rates and need to reprice assets and liabilities according to 
their contractual repricing characteristics. To do so we assume that at the time t=0 of issuance the 
economic value equals the face value of the asset. This implies that 
i i
t A X EVA     ) ( 0 0  in equation 
(A1). Solving for 
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Annex 2: A simple multi-period example 
To provide some intuition for the dynamic set-up, it is useful to consider a simplified bank with 
two asset classes A
i, A









j) and gets repriced after one (two) period. Each asset class consists of an infinitely fined 
grained portfolio of assets so that realised losses equal expected losses conditional on X.
Liabilities are repriced every period and pay a coupon rate C
L equal to the risk-free interest rate r.
We also assumed that the risk-free yield curve is flat and the macro environment is such that 
E(PD1)=E(PD2) for both assets. 
Following equation (A4), the initial risk-free yield curve and expected PDs in period one and two 
determine coupon rates 
i C0
 and 
j C0  for each asset class. Assume that the realisation of X1 is such 
that PDs and interest rates do not change and PD1=E(PD1) for both assets. Hence, there will be no 




default. If an asset with unit size defaults, the bank looses LGD
i (1+C
i) as discussed above. Hence, 
losses accounting for defaulted coupons and principals are  
j j j j i i i i A C LGD PD A C LGD PD L ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0 1 0 1 1       (A5) 
Given that the bank does not re-price any assets and liabilities NI1 is just  
L C A C A C NI
L j j i i
0 0 0 1       (A6)
where the first and second term are cash flow contributions from asset i and asset j and the third 
term are interest payments on liabilities L. Net profits are therefore 
 NP1=NI1-L1  (A7)
Given our assumptions that the term structure of interest rates and PDs is flat, net interest income 
NI exactly offsets credit risk losses which equal expected losses in this case. Hence NP1=0.
Coupon rates for period two can be forecasted by following the same line of argumentation as 
above. But assume that the realisation of X2 is such that  1 2 PD PD ! for both asset classes even 
though risk-free interest rate remains unchanged so that  r C C
L L
    0 1 . As asset class A
i has a one 
period maturity, the bank is able to reprice A
i to reflect the higher credit risk and 
i i
C C 0 1 ! . 
However, the bank can not reprice asset class A
j as coupon rates are locked-in for another period 
given the assumed maturity of 2 periods. Net interest income for period two is  
L C A C A C NI
L j j i i
1 0 1 2     .   (A8)43
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Even though NI2>NI1 the bank will be expected to make a loss in this period as cash flows earned 
on asset j will not offset write-offs in this asset class given higher PDs. Table A2.1 summarises the 
dynamic example. 
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L j j i i
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L j j i i
1 0 1 2    
Net Profits  0  <0 
In order to implement our framework, we rely on two approximations. The first one consists of 
assuming that banks use a random walk model to form expectations on future PDs, i.e. they 
t t+k)=PDt. Using model-consistent expectations is possible but computationally 
27 In order to assess the implications 
of this approximation, we replicated the baseline case using model-consistent expectations as a 
sensitivity test.
28 This indicates that wrongly formed expectations slightly bias income levels 
downwards and decrease the variance of RNI,  which was to be expected as model-consistent 
expectations are less volatile. Most importantly, the error margins introduced by this 
approximation for MEC are small and below 2% at all confidence levels. 
Second, when calculating the discount factors D
i
t+k, we approximate equation (A2) as follows 

  
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27 For each quarter t=1, ..., 4 and scenario s=1,...,10,000 we need expectations for 6 PDs over a 10 year horizon; the 
implied total number of expectations to be calculated is 4*10,000*6*40 = 9,600,000. 
28 Results are available on request.  
very cumbersome given the high dimensionality of the model.
assume that E(PD
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The last equality holds as the forward yield curve is known at the time of pricing and LGDs are 
fixed. By looking at the product of expectations rather than the expectation of the product, though, 
we ignore any conditional cross-correlations between discount factors at different points in time. It 
is hard to quantify the bias this introduces as the simulation becomes too complex to calculate 
coupon rates correctly. However, we would argue that the bias does not affect our results in a 
significant fashion. As pointed out above, at the time of pricing the forward yield curve is known 
and LGDs are fixed. Therefore, the conditional correlation is driven by the conditional correlation 
between PDs. All PDs are by construction conditionally homoscedastic - a property they inherit 
from the GVAR (see equations 23-24). Hence, their conditional auto-correlations are constant over 
time. Furthermore, the realised unconditional autocorrelations are small and positive, and decline 
rapidly to zero for lag lengths greater than one.
29This would suggest that the bias is not substantial 
and that the coupons we calculate are too low on average. Given the robustness tests in Section 
6.1, this means that ECNP in our base case is likely to be too high in comparison to the case where 
the approximation would not be made.  
                                                
29 We assessed correlation coefficients of PDs for 6 asset classes empirically by looking at the distribution of 
correlation coefficients implicit in the simulation. Results are available on request.  45
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Annex 4: Additional Tables  
Table A1: Balance Sheet 
Assets Repricing buckets: Total
1-3 m 3-6 m 6-12 m 1-5 y >5 y non i.b.
Bank UK 12,783 697 560 130 249 1,378 14,418
HH.Mort UK 41,331 4,137 3,736 16,678 1,886 134 67,767
HH.Unsec UK 7,278 692 607 3,320 1,000 653 12,896
Gov UK 954 94 68 242 302 872 1,660
PNFC UK 21,374 1,701 1,357 1,318 523 14 26,273
OFC UK 15,769 1,635 1,429 5,757 4,402 1,545 28,992
Other UK 16,256 1,596 1,265 3,708 6,693 24,806 29,517
Bank US 19,537 1,065 855 198 381 2,106 22,037
HH.Mort US 25,722 2,574 2,325 10,379 1,173 83 42,174
HH.Unsec US 4,529 431 378 2,066 622 406 8,026
Gov US 1,292 127 97 310 475 1,609 2,301
PNFC US 13,302 1,059 844 820 325 8 16,351
OFC US 9,814 1,018 889 3,583 2,740 961 18,043
Other US 31,050 3,048 2,416 7,083 12,783 47,381 56,379
Total assets 428,789
Liabilities Repricing buckets: Total
1-3 m 3-6 m 6-12 m 1-5 y >5 y non i.b.
Bank UK 38,050 2,069 1,229 680 902 1,035 43,965
HH UK 69,472 2,838 2,881 2,377 350 5,409 83,327
Gov UK 1,651 106 114 68 10 160 2,110
PNFC UK 22,177 695 677 622 172 2,758 27,101
OFC UK 57,146 1,957 1,779 1,556 367 7,324 70,129
Sub UK 11,889 948 683 2,506 8,491 10,199 34,716
Other UK 61,240 4,195 3,483 7,892 7,917 63,828 148,555
Total liabilties 409,902
Shareholder funds 18,887
Note: in millions.  46
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Table A2: Pricing of Assets 
Asset Class
30 Modelling of Cash Flow 
UK interbank unsecured
31  Risk-free rate +15bps 
UK household secured 
(mortgage) 
Coupon from net interest income model +50bps 
UK household unsecured  Coupon from net interest income model +50bps 
UK government  Risk-free rate 
UK PNFC  Coupon from net interest income model +50bps 
UK OFC  Risk-free rate +15bps 
UK other assets
32 Risk-free  rate 
US interbank unsecured  Risk-free rate +15bps 
US household secured 
(mortgage) 
Coupon from net interest income model +50bps 
US household unsecured  Coupon from net interest income model +50bps 
US government  Risk-free rate 
US PNFC  Coupon from net interest income model +50bps 
US OFC  Risk-free rate +15bps 
US other assets  Risk-free rate 
Table A3: Pricing of Liabilities 
Liability Class Modelling of Cash Flow
Unsecured interbank
33  Risk-free rate +15bps 
Household  Risk-free rate minus variable negative spread
34
Government Risk-free  rate 
PNFC  Risk-free rate minus variable negative spread
35
OFC Risk-free  rate 
Subordinated liabilities  Risk-free rate +15bps 
Other liabilities
36  Risk-free rate +15bps 
                                                
30 All footnotes referring to UK asset classes also apply to US asset classes. 
31 Unsecured interbank loans + derivatives + certificates of deposit.  
32 Includes reverse repos. 
33 Unsecured interbank deposits + derivatives. 
34 The negative spread on household deposits is 200bps in the 0-3 months repricing bucket, 150bps in the 3-6 month 
bucket, 100bps in the 6-9 month bucket, 50bps in the 9-12 month bucket and 0bps at longer maturities. 
35 The negative spread on corporate deposits us 100bps in the 0-3 months repricing bucket, 75bps in the 3-6 month 
bucket, 50bps in the 6-9 month bucket, 25bps in the 9-12 month bucket and 0bps at longer maturities. 
36 Includes debt securities and repos. 47
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Table A4: Losses, income and profits under alternative pricing assumptions 
mean median st.dev. min max .1 %tile 1 %tile 5% tile 95 %tile 99 %tile 99.9 %tile
No negative spreads on liabilities
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,871
Net interest income (NI) 3,303 3,302 252 2,318 4,337 2,532 2,711 2,892 3,716 3,891 4,079
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 3,274 3,273 254 2,290 4,315 2,492 2,681 2,860 3,690 3,867 4,057
Net-Profits 1,897 2,074 813 -12,506 3,146 -5,686 -1,621 520 2,545 2,733 2,956
No additive spreads
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,872
Net interest income (NI) 2,435 2,434 252 1,451 3,469 1,665 1,844 2,024 2,849 3,023 3,211
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 2,408 2,407 254 1,423 3,449 1,627 1,815 1,994 2,823 3,001 3,191
Net-Profits 1,030 1,208 813 -13,354 2,279 -6,543 -2,483 -344 1,678 1,867 2,089
Pricing of all assets and liabilities as risk free instruments
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,871
Net interest income (NI) 1,939 1,940 256 964 2,974 1,147 1,348 1,523 2,358 2,538 2,721
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 1,921 1,923 258 944 2,964 1,124 1,324 1,502 2,343 2,523 2,711
Net-Profits 543 719 815 -13,849 1,814 -7,050 -2,955 -836 1,200 1,397 1,636
Note: in millions.
Table A5: De-meaned loss, income and profit distributions under alternative pricing 
assumptions 
min 0.1% 1% 5% mean 95% 99% 99.9% max
Base simulation
Credit losses -543 -445 -388 -345 0 1,348 3,412 7,493 14,410
NI -1,017 -797 -611 -424 0 422 585 725 870
RNI -1,018 -809 -612 -429 0 424 589 733 865
Net-Profits -14,394 -7,586 -3,516 -1,372 0 657 847 1,030 1,166
No spreads on liabilities
Credit losses -543 -445 -388 -345 0 1,348 3,412 7,493 14,410
NI -984 -770 -591 -410 0 414 588 776 1,034
RNI -985 -783 -593 -415 0 416 593 783 1,041
Net-Profits -14,402 -7,582 -3,518 -1,376 0 649 837 1,060 1,250
No additive spreads
Credit losses -543 -445 -388 -345 0 1,348 3,412 7,493 14,410
NI -984 -770 -591 -410 0 414 588 776 1,034
RNI -985 -781 -593 -414 0 415 593 783 1,040
Net-Profits -14,384 -7,573 -3,513 -1,374 0 648 837 1,059 1,249
Pricing of all assets and liabilities as risk free instruments
Credit losses -543 -445 -388 -345 0 1,348 3,412 7,493 14,410
NI -975 -792 -591 -417 0 419 599 781 1,035
RNI -977 -797 -597 -420 0 422 602 790 1,043
Net-Profits -14,392 -7,593 -3,497 -1,379 0 657 855 1,093 1,271
Note: in millions.  
Table A6: Losses, income and profits for a granular portfolio 
mean median st.dev. min max .1 %tile 1 %tile 5% tile 95 %tile 99 %tile 99.9 %tile
Credit risk losses 1,383 1,382 34 1,282 1,533 1,288 1,308 1,328 1,441 1,465 1,491
Net interest income (NI) 4,811 4,809 257 3,841 5,604 4,030 4,217 4,386 5,233 5,407 5,554
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 4,783 4,781 259 3,807 5,579 3,996 4,185 4,355 5,208 5,382 5,531
Net-Profits 3,400 3,400 263 2,380 4,216 2,594 2,795 2,962 3,834 4,003 4,160
Note: in millions. Spreads are paid on deposits and assets as in the base simulation.48
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1041
April 2009
Table A7: Losses, income and profits if all liabilities are short term or long term 
mean median st.dev. min max .1 %tile 1 %tile 5% tile 95 %tile 99 %tile 99.9 %tile
Only short term liabilities
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,871
Net interest income (NI) 4,689 4,690 596 2,393 6,814 2,855 3,308 3,712 5,664 6,065 6,435
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 4,660 4,660 597 2,364 6,780 2,819 3,274 3,683 5,637 6,044 6,416
Net-Profits 3,282 3,407 974 -11,511 5,544 -4,471 -386 1,757 4,457 4,873 5,281
Only long term liabilities
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,871
Net interest income (NI) 4,682 4,681 1,932 -3,116 12,159 -1,273 168 1,512 7,820 9,136 10,509
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 4,654 4,654 1,930 -3,138 12,130 -1,295 132 1,488 7,789 9,107 10,479
Net-Profits 3,276 3,338 2,087 -12,778 11,006 -5,056 -1,897 -217 6,554 7,901 9,342
Note: in millions. Spreads are paid on deposits and assets as in base simulation.
Table A8: Interest rate gaps for th e base case, if all liabilities are short or long 
1-3 m 3-6 m 6-12 m 1-5 y >5 y non i.b.
IR gap base -9.5% 1.6% 1.4% 9.3% 3.6% -2.0%
IR gap short -22.9% 4.6% 3.9% 13.0% 7.8% -2.0%
IR gap long 51.5% 4.6% 3.9% -57.2% 3.6% -2.0%
Repricing buckets
Table A9: Losses, income and profits for changing equity levels 
mean median st.dev. min max .1 %tile 1 %tile 5% tile 95 %tile 99 %tile 99.9 %tile
Equity = 0%
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,872
Net interest income (NI) 1,708 1,707 352 334 3,149 631 891 1,135 2,288 2,528 2,794
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 1,682 1,681 354 307 3,129 595 862 1,106 2,262 2,501 2,774
Net-Profits 303 463 848 -14,103 1,910 -7,326 -3,203 -1,092 1,101 1,363 1,650
Equity = 4%
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,872
Net interest income (NI) 2,368 2,367 261 1,348 3,439 1,569 1,756 1,942 2,797 2,978 3,173
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 2,341 2,340 263 1,321 3,419 1,531 1,728 1,912 2,772 2,955 3,153
Net-Profits 963 1,140 815 -13,414 2,245 -6,615 -2,549 -408 1,624 1,821 2,049
Equity = 8%
Credit risk losses 1,378 1,146 765 835 15,788 933 990 1,033 2,726 4,790 8,872
Net interest income (NI) 3,028 3,027 170 2,362 3,730 2,503 2,628 2,748 3,308 3,425 3,551
Net interest income including losses due 
to defaulted coupons (RNI) 3,001 3,000 172 2,335 3,709 2,464 2,595 2,720 3,284 3,402 3,533
Net-Profits 1,623 1,821 792 -12,823 2,580 -5,954 -1,838 257 2,153 2,286 2,447
Note: in millions. No additive spreads are paid on deposits and assets.49
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Annex 5: Additional figures 
Figure A1: A stylised credit risk loss distribution  











Figure A2: A stylised net profit distribution in the one period set-up with fixed coupons 
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Figure A3: Implementation of the framework  
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Re-balancing of balance sheet
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Re-balancing of balance sheet
Figure A4: Size distribution of the hypothetical portfolio 
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Figure A5: Distribution of UK macro variables in the final quarter (%, annualised) 
Panel A: Overnight Interest Rate (SR) 









Panel B: 20-year interest rates (LR) 









Panel C: Real output growth (GDP) 









Panel D: Inflation Rate (CPI) 









Panel E: Real Equity Price Growth (EQT) 
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Figure A6: Distribution of UK default rates in the final quarter (%, annualised)
Panel A: Corporate Loans 









Panel B: Unsecured Personal Loans 









Panel C: Mortgages 
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